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RESPONSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL BEHAVIOR, 
ENERGY CONSERVATION, AND COMPACT 
FLUORESCENT BULBS: YOU CAN LEAD A 
HORSE TO WATER, BUT CAN YOU MAKE IT 
DRINK? 
Hope M. Babcock* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Despite professing to care about the environment and supporting 
environmental causes, individuals behave in environmentally 
irresponsible ways like driving when they can take public transportation, 
littering, or disposing of toxic materials in unsound ways. This is my 
fourth exploration of how to encourage individuals to stop behaving 
irresponsibly about the environment they allege to care deeply about. 
The prior three articles all explored how the norm of environmental 
protection could be enlisted in this effort; this Article applies those 
theoretical conclusions to the very practical task of getting people to 
switch the type of light bulb they use and thus adhere to the concrete 
norm of energy conservation. 
To help situate this piece better in my prior work, the first article 
proposed expanding the abstract environmental protection norm to 
include individual environmental responsibility as the approach most 
likely to overcome barriers to behavioral change.1 That article 
recommended enlisting environmental groups as the most effective 
“norm entrepreneurs” to achieve widespread change in personal 
environmental conduct.2 The piece concluded that the best way to 
change norms and thus change behavior is through education, but that 
                                                           
 * Professor of Law Georgetown University Law Center. The ideas in this Article were first 
presented in abbreviated form at the Symposium on Energy and the Environment at Hofstra 
University School of Law, where I received helpful comments from members of the panel and the 
audience. I am indebted to my research assistant, Angela Navarro, for her careful editing and to my 
colleague at Institute for Public Representation at Georgetown, Jamie Pleune, for her substantive 
comments on this Article. 
 1. See Hope M. Babcock, Global Climate Change: A Civic Republican Moment for 
Achieving Broader Changes in Environmental Behavior, 26 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 3 (2009). 
 2. Id. at 14, 17; Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 
909 (1996) (defining “norm entrepreneurs” as “people interested in changing social norms”). When 
successful, norm entrepreneurs produce “norm bandwagons,” which are created when small changes 
in behavior result in large ones, and “norm cascades,” which happen when there are “rapid shifts in 
norms.” Id. 
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additional measures might be necessary.3 
The second article expanded on the earlier discussion of norms and 
their influence on behavior, and why changing norms, though difficult, 
is more effective than other means of inciting behavioral change.4 
However, given the difficulty inherent in creating or changing norms, 
the second article also identified and evaluated several norm- and 
behavior-changing tactics, such as shaming, public education, and 
market-based incentives.5 That article concluded that no single tactic is 
sufficient to secure both norm and behavior change, but that a 
combination of any or all of them when properly tailored to the source 
and nature of the harm and when accompanied by public education can 
lead to both norm and behavioral change.6  
The third piece examined how republican theory supports the 
critical role of public education in informing and changing norms and 
provides the theoretical framework within which norm and behavior 
change can occur.7 All three pieces use as a starting premise the theory 
that the current crisis over global climate change has created the 
circumstances in which norm change can occur—circumstances that 
collectively have created what I call a second environmental republican 
moment.8 It is during republican moments that individuals are most 
amenable to learning about their responsibilities as citizens.9  
This fourth Article synthesizes the previous articles into an 
assumption about the critical role of norms in changing personal 
behavior and tests that assumption by exploring how to make individuals 
more responsible consumers of electricity and adhere to the concrete 
norm of energy conservation10 by swapping out their incandescent light 
bulbs for compact fluorescent lights (“CFLs”).11 The agreed upon goal 
                                                           
 3. Babcock, supra note 1, at 17. 
 4. Hope M. Babcock, Assuming Personal Responsibility for Improving the Environment: 
Moving Toward a New Environmental Norm, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 117, 118 (2009). 
 5. Id. at 159, 165. 
 6. Id. at 174. 
 7. Hope M. Babcock, Civic Republicanism Provides Theoretical Support for Making 
Individuals More Environmentally Responsible, 23 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 515, 
516 (2009). 
 8. The first occurred during the 1960s and 1970s and culminated in Earth Day. See Daniel A. 
Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 59, 66 (1992) (calling 
1970 Earth Day, involving participation of twenty million people in various public events, a 
“‘republican moment’”). 
 9. Id.  
 10. See Babcock, supra note 4, at 137 (discussing concrete norms). 
 11. The importance of reducing demand for electricity is captured by Chairman Alan Schriber 
of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio when he said, “You can build wind generators and solar 
panels. All that’s nice, but at the end of the day, reducing consumption is the cheapest way to do 
it . . . . By decreasing demand, you forgo the need to continually build [power plants].” Peter Slevin 
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behind energy conservation is to reduce the country’s reliance on fossil 
fuel-based energy production, thus reducing the emission of harmful 
airborne pollutants and greenhouse gases as well as the related 
environmental harms associated with coal production.12 One way to 
reduce residential energy consumption is to persuade individuals to 
switch to CFLs.13 Up to ninety percent of energy produced by 
incandescent bulbs is lost as heat; switching to CFLs is one way to 
prevent this energy loss.14 
However, getting individuals to switch bulbs is not as easy as one 
might think because of various barriers that stand in the way of changing 
environmental behavior.15 Some of these obstacles are unique to CFLs; 
others are more generic. This Article identifies and evaluates the 
likelihood of success of two fairly new utility-sponsored initiatives that 
are designed to reduce residential energy consumption. This Article also 
identifies one more broadly designed initiative to change personal 
behavior—to see whether the underlying behavioral motivators in each 
of these initiatives could get individuals to swap out their traditional 
light bulbs for energy saving CFLs.16  
                                                           
& Steven Mufson, Stimulus Dollars Energize Efforts to Smarten Up the Electric Power Grid, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2009, at A1. 
 12. President Obama has made clean energy a centerpiece of his new Administration, part of 
which entails reducing the country’s dependence on fossil fuels. See Editorial, Mr. Obama’s Energy 
Future, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2009, at A30. 
 13. See infra notes 38-47 and accompanying text (discussing the effectiveness of CFLs). 
 14. Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Household Electricity Report, http://eia.doe.gov/emeu/ 
reps/enduse/er01_us.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2009). The European Commission recently adopted 
regulations that will phase out incandescent light bulbs during the next three years and call for the 
use of more energy-efficient alternatives, such as CFLs, to “‘deliver a clear message about the EU’s 
commitment to reach its energy efficiency and climate protection targets.’” James Murray, EU 
Declares an End to Inefficient Bulbs, BUSINESSGREEN, Mar. 18, 2009, 
http://www.businessgreen.com/2238713 (quoting the European Energy Commissioner, Andris 
Piebalgs). 
 15. See Ann E. Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1243 (2001). 
 16. This Article does not consider the approach of external sanctions, such as fines for 
exceeding preset levels of energy use, because of the difficulties that implementing these sanctions 
would entail, including the potential for political backlash and the invasion of privacy by the 
government to acquire information about consumer behavior from the utilities as well as the high 
monitoring and enforcement costs of implementing such a program. See id. at 1235 (“When 
numerous people must act to solve a collective problem and lack the economic incentive to do so, 
traditional government regulation, such as formal law, may be infeasible, ineffectual, or politically 
difficult. The costs of monitoring and enforcement can be prohibitively expensive or may raise 
privacy concerns. Many environmental problems are illustrative[, such as] . . . carpooling, 
stormwater pollution prevention, [and] energy conservation.”); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, How 
Changes in Property Regimes Influence Social Norms: Commodifying California’s Carpool Lanes, 
75 IND. L.J. 1231, 1276 (2000). (“Heavy handed mechanisms—such as large tolls charged to all 
solo commuters, or public campaigns labeling solo commuters as environmental criminals—would 
certainly spur a backlash.”); Michael P. Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV: The Individual as 
Regulated Entity in the New Era of Environmental Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 515, 520 (2004) 
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Somewhat to my surprise, and perhaps to the surprise of anyone 
who has read my previous work in this area, this Article reaches the 
conclusion that the perceived problems with CFLs are sufficiently severe 
that no amount of persuasion will induce individuals to acquire them, 
despite their individual and social benefits. Rather, structural—what 
Professor Ann Carlson calls “architectural”17—changes need to be made 
to CFLs to eliminate their negative features and to make their acquisition 
and disposal easier before the motivational tools identified in the three 
initiatives can have any effect on consumers.  
In support of this conclusion, the first Part of this Article provides 
some background information on residential electricity consumption to 
show why reducing the amount of consumption in this sector is 
important and how substituting a single CFL for a traditional 
incandescent bulb can contribute to this result. The second Part identifies 
various barriers that stand in the way of consumers swapping out light 
bulbs, particularly hurdles that are unique to CFLs. The third Part of the 
Article describes three different approaches to reducing residential 
energy use—smart meters, comparative consumer information, and 
personal incentives. This Part identifies the dominant persuasive 
technique employed in each of the three approaches. It then evaluates the 
effectiveness of these techniques at overcoming barriers to behavioral 
change based upon what is known about their use in other contexts 
where behavior change was sought.  
The final section of this Article pulls together the results of the 
previous sections to determine if any motivational technique, alone or in 
combination, might induce individuals to adhere to the norm of energy 
conservation by purchasing CFLs. Answering this question in the 
negative, this Article concludes that behavioral change in this context 
will not occur without reducing the structural barriers that stand in the 
way, relegating both persuasive techniques and norm-induced behavioral 
change to a secondary, albeit still important role. 
                                                           
[hereinafter Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV] (arguing that when regulators have tried “to 
impose restrictions on individual behavior[,] . . . the restrictions have been unpopular and have 
provoked a public backlash”); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance: A Testable Typology of 
Social Norms in Corporate Environmental Compliance, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 55, 101 (2003) 
[hereinafter Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance] (“[T]he greater the perceived importance of 
autonomy, the less likely the individual will respond to threats of formal legal sanctions by 
increasing compliance. Instead, when the freedom to conduct an activity is very important, 
individuals may react to increased threats to restrict that freedom by simply increasing their 
commitment to the illegal activity.”). 
 17. Carlson, supra note 15, at 1265 (suggesting indirect ways of encouraging environmentally 
positive behavior by the use of “[a]rchitectural [m]echanisms” that “facilitate” good environmental 
behavior). 
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II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON RESIDENTIAL ENERGY USE AND 
THE POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION OF CFLS TO DECREASING THAT USE 
Americans consume a lot of electricity, and projections show that 
they will continue to consume more rather than less.18 The most 
common source of electricity continues to be coal-fired plants,19 which 
emit pollutants like particulate matter, sulfur dioxide, and mercury, as 
well as greenhouse gases.20  
In 2001, electricity consumption in the United States totaled 1140 
billion kilowatt-hours.21 Since the late 1970s, retail sales of electricity to 
U.S. households have exceeded sales to the commercial and industry 
sectors.22 In 2003, retail sales of electricity to the residential sector 
totaled 1.3 trillion kilowatt-hours.23 The growth in the residential 
sector’s share of overall electricity consumption is due to population 
growth as well as increasing ownership and electrification of single 
family households.24  
Electrification of homes and construction of new homes contribute 
to this change.25 The largest end uses of electricity in U.S. households in 
2001 were central air-conditioning and refrigerators, each accounting for 
about fourteen percent of the total residential energy consumed.26 The 
                                                           
 18. Recognizing the need to decrease the nation’s reliance on fossil fuel and improve energy 
efficiency, over $20 billion included in the stimulus package was earmarked for improving the 
efficiency of government buildings and the homes of the poor. Kate Galbraith, Bright Lights, Big 
Budget: Nation Prepares for a Flood of Spending on Energy Efficiency, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2009, 
at B1. 
 19. According to the Energy Information Administration, 49.6% of the electricity generated in 
2005 was fueled by coal; for the last twelve months of record (through December 2008), this 
number dropped slightly to 48.5%. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ELECTRIC 
POWER MONTHLY 13 (2009), http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epm/epm.pdf. 
 20. According to the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), the 2005 National Average 
Emissions Rate for carbon dioxide, the most common greenhouse gas, from residential electricity 
was 1329 pounds of carbon dioxide per megawatt-hour. EPA, EGRID2007 VERSION 1.1: YEAR 2005 
SUMMARY TABLES 1 (2008), http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/documents/egridzips/eGRID2007V1 
_1_year05_SummaryTables.pdf. Google calculates that based on an average of 7.5 tonnes of carbon 
dioxide emitted per year per household and 4.5 tonnes of carbon dioxide emitted per year per 
conventional car, an energy savings of ten percent for six households would reduce carbon emission 
by about the same amount as taking one conventional car off the road. Google.org, Google 
PowerMeter Data Sources, http://www.google.org/powermeter/calculation.html. 
 21. Energy Info. Admin., supra note 14. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. While federal and state efficiency standards have improved the energy consumption of 
major appliances like air conditioning systems and refrigerators, turnover in those appliances is 
extremely slow. This means that their effect on the total amount of energy consumed per household 
per annum is less than what one might otherwise think. However, newer, more efficient refrigerators 
and freezers can, to some extent, offset the effect of higher energy consumption from the purchase 
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number of households with central air-conditioning rose from twenty- 
seven percent in 1980 to fifty-five percent in 2001, in part due to the 
construction of new homes in the southern part of the country.27 The 106 
million households with color TVs accounted for thirty-three billion 
kilowatt-hours and comprised the largest single home electronics use 
that year—VCRs/DVDs, cable boxes, and satellite dishes added sixteen 
billion kilowatt-hours to the total.28 Sixty million households had 
personal computers, fifty-one million of which had Internet access as 
well as printers, accounting for a combined twenty-three billion 
kilowatt-hours.29 According to the Energy Information Administration 
(“EIA”), over the next twenty years, the demand for electricity to power 
household appliances and home electronics, particularly color TVs and 
computer equipment, is projected to increase rapidly.30 
Although lighting accounted for only 8.8 percent of U.S. household 
electricity use in 2001,31 it is one area in which a significant decrease in 
residential electricity consumption can be made.32 However, although an 
obvious way to reduce the level of residential electricity use is to get 
individuals to turn off their lights when not in use, this is difficult to do 
because of personal habits, which arise from “‘[r]epeated interactions’”33 
and which are a major determinant of individual behavior.34 It is also 
                                                           
of more powerful home office equipment, more extensive home entertainment systems, or 
additional kitchen appliances. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. The EIA projects electricity consumption for color TVs and computers will grow 3.5 
percent annually through 2025 to more than double the level of consumption of those home 
electronics in 2003. Id. 
 31. Id.; see also Walmart Fact Sheets, http://walmartstores.com/FactsNews/FactSheets/ 
(under “Topics” follow “Sustainability”; then follow “Compact Fluorescent Light Bulbs Fact Sheet” 
hyperlink) (attributing “nearly 20 percent of all home electric costs in the U. S.” to lighting). 
 32. The other obvious area is to have people turn off electric lights when they are not in use. 
The barriers to doing this are discussed later in this Article as part of the justification of focusing on 
swapping out incandescent bulbs for CFLs. See infra notes 51-58 and accompanying text. 
 33. David R. Karp, The New Debate About Shame in Criminal Justice: An Interactionist 
Account, 21 JUST. SYS. J. 301, 313 (2000) (arguing that habits “‘become expectations in the sense of 
predictions or anticipations of [individual] behavior,’” which pressure individuals to meet those 
expectations “‘partly out of a feeling that the other will be irritated, offended, or disappointed if the 
expectation is not fulfilled’” (quoting DENNIS H. WRONG, THE PROBLEM OF ORDER: WHAT UNITES 
AND DIVIDES SOCIETY 48 (1994))). 
 34. See Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV, supra note 16, at 594-95. Because habits 
circumvent decisional processes, they save cognitive time and energy and “habits tend to truncate 
the traditional subjective expected utility calculation by creating a ‘habitual mindset.’ . . . Strong 
habits also may impede the influence of personal norms.” Id.; see also Michael P. Vandenbergh, 
Order Without Social Norms: How Personal Norm Activation Can Protect the Environment, 99 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1101, 1165 (2005) (stating that “many behavior changes that would generate a large 
payoff for the individual are blocked by habits or other psychological barriers”). Habits play a 
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extremely difficult to get people to refrain from consuming products that 
improve the quality of their lives,35 even if they depend on high levels of 
electricity, like plasma TVs or digital picture frames.36 These problems 
are one reason that attention has focused on increasing the use of 
CFLs.37 
Incandescent light bulbs, which are found in most households, are 
extremely inefficient sources of light because about ninety percent of the 
energy used by them is lost as heat.38 CFLs use between one fifth and 
one third less power than equivalent incandescent lamps, generate 
significantly less heat, and last up to ten times longer.39 If every one of 
the 110 million households in the United States replaced a conventional 
sixty-watt incandescent bulb with one CFL, the energy saved by that 
small action would be enough to power a city of 1.5 million people.40 
One swapped-out bulb per house could power all the homes in Delaware 
and Rhode Island.41 In terms of greenhouse gases not emitted into the 
                                                           
greater role in maintaining behaviors, such as leaving lights or the computer on, than in making a 
single investment, for example by changing a light bulb. See Stephanie Stern, Encouraging 
Conservation on Private Lands: A Behavioral Analysis of Financial Incentives, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 
541, 561-62 (2006) (stating that people “prefer to invest in new technology, such as the purchase of 
energy-efficient appliances, rather than change their daily behaviors and habits” because they see 
these investments as improving the quality of their lives, while behavioral change “is often 
experienced as a deprivation”). Habits are even harder to overcome if the new behavior is 
inconvenient, requires significant effort, or is costly, like restarting the computer or turning on the 
lights every time a room is reentered. Carlson, supra note 15, at 1236. 
 35. Holly Doremus, Biodiversity and the Challenge of Saving the Ordinary, 38 IDAHO L. REV. 
325, 344-45, 351 (2002) (stating that people “are capable of self-restraint, but it does not come 
easily”); see also Babcock, supra note 4, at 122-23 (discussing the environmental problems from 
personal consumption); Douglas A. Kysar, Law, Environment, and Vision, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 675, 
723 (2003) (arguing that the phenomenon of the competitive consumer who “continually trades in 
goods for the latest model with the latest features” because she “desires . . . to possess something 
that relatively few others are capable of attaining, [is] an observable symbol that signifies success 
under prevailing social norms”).  
 36. All Things Considered: Digital Frames Have Environmental Cost (NPR radio broadcast 
Feb. 16, 2009) (stating that if each family in the United States had one digital picture frame, the 
country would need five new power plants to keep pace with the demand for electricity). 
 37. An even more efficient bulb, the organic light-emitting diode (“OLED”) is under 
development at the Department of Energy. OLEDs will produce approximately 160 lumens of light 
per watt compared to traditional incandescent bulbs, which produce only five lumens per watt, and 
CFLs, which produce roughly fifty lumens per watt. See Jenny Mandel, Energy Efficiency: DOE 
Researcher Solves Part of Lighting Riddle, GREENWIRE, Mar. 25, 2009, 
http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/print/2009/03/25/3. 
 38. Energy Info. Admin., supra note 14. 
 39. LINDA REMBOWSKI, THE DEFINITIVE ENVIRONMENTAL GUIDE TO GOING GREEN FOR 
GOOD 25, 57-58 (2009); Walmart Fact Sheets, supra note 31 (“An ENERGYSTAR-qualified CFL 
uses about 75 percent less energy than standard incandescent bulbs and lasts up to 10 times 
longer.”). 
 40. Charles Fishman, How Many Lightbulbs Does it Take to Change the World?: One. And 
You’re Looking at It, FAST COMPANY, Sept. 2006, at 74, 76. 
 41. Id. 
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atmosphere, one swapped out bulb per 110 million households is equal 
to taking 1.3 million cars off the road and would save enough electricity 
to turn off two power plants permanently or avoid building the next two, 
assuming the demand level for electricity did not creep back up.42 
Therefore, if every U.S. household substituted just one CFL for one 
incandescent bulb, the savings in electricity and resultant environmental 
benefits would be impressive. Just one CFL can prevent 690 pounds of 
greenhouse gases from being emitted into the atmosphere and 200 
pounds of coal from being burned in power plants.43 
The typical U.S. household has between fifty and one hundred 
sockets.44 Imagine if individuals switched more than one bulb. The 
question is how to motivate each household to swap even one 
incandescent bulb for a CFL. 
Motivating individuals to change their light bulbs should not be 
difficult to do given the obvious environmental benefits of using CFLs 
and the public’s strong acceptance of the environmental protection 
norm.45 Moreover, unlike refraining from dumping waste motor oil 
down a drain or spreading pesticides on a lawn, which have no apparent 
benefit to the polluter,46 reducing electricity use has a direct beneficial 
effect on the individual in the form of reduced electrical bills.47 A direct 
monetary benefit to the individual can act to overcome her temptation to 
free-ride on the environmental good works of others and gain the 
                                                           
 42. Id.; see also Energy Star, Compact Fluorescent Light Bulbs for Consumers, 
http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=cfls.pr_cfls (last visited Oct. 20, 2009) (“If every American 
home replaced just one light bulb with an ENERGY STAR qualified bulb, we would save enough 
energy to light more than 3 million homes for a year, more than $600 million in annual energy 
costs, and prevent greenhouse gases equivalent to the emissions of more than 800,000 cars.”). 
ENERGY STAR qualified bulbs use about seventy-five percent less energy than standard 
incandescent bulbs and last up to ten times longer. Energy Star, Qualified Compact Florescent Light 
Bulbs (CFLs): At a Glance, http://www.energystar.gov/ia/partners/manuf_res/salestraining_res/ 
CFL_AtAGlance.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2009). They save about thirty dollars or more in 
electricity costs over each bulb’s lifetime and produce about seventy-five percent less heat, so they 
are safer to operate and can cut energy costs associated with home cooling. Id. 
 43. See Walmart Fact Sheets, supra note 31. 
 44. Fishman, supra note 40, at 76. 
 45. See Vandenbergh, supra note 34, at 1117 (stating that the “abstract norm favoring 
protection of human health and the environment is widely held, stable, and influential”); see also 
Farber, supra note 8, at 65. 
 46. See Babcock, supra note 4, at 142; see also Carlson, supra note 15, at 1242 (noting that 
while proper environmental behavior “produces environmental benefits[,] . . . it remains the case 
that these are generalized benefits to the collective not typically viewed as producing any 
substantial, immediate benefit at an individual level”). 
 47. Changing the incandescent light bulbs in an average size house to CFLs can save Wal-
Mart customers $350 a year and a typical small business $1325 a year in energy costs. Walmart, 
Wal-Mart Surpasses Goal to Sell 100 Million Compact Fluorescent Light Bulbs Three Months 
Early, http://walmartstores.com/FactsNews/NewsRoom/6756.aspx (last visited Oct. 20, 2009). 
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collective goods of an improved environment.48 However, there are 
many obstacles, which are discussed in the next Part of this Article, that 
impede individuals from behaving in conformance with the energy 
conservation norm by swapping out their incandescent light bulbs. 
III. BARRIERS TO CHANGING LIGHT BULBS 
Despite the fact that individuals can save money and thus 
experience a direct benefit by switching light bulbs, it is not easy to 
motivate them to engage in this activity and adhere to the concrete norm 
of energy conservation.49 There are many barriers that stand in the way 
of responsible environmental behavior that are difficult to overcome, 
even before individuals encounter the specific problems generated by 
CFLs.50 
A. Barriers to Behaving in an Environmentally Responsible Way 
Habits and self interest as well as the inconvenience and cost of the 
new behavior and the unavailability of alternatives are examples of 
common barriers that must be overcome before individuals will change 
their behavior. In addition, the persistence of the myth that only industry 
is responsible for environmental harm51 and the difficulty individuals 
have understanding how their seemingly minor actions (changing a light 
bulb) can accumulate into more serious, widespread harm (polar bears 
drowning as the planet warms),52 contribute to the resistance of 
individuals to changing their environmental behavior. 
Individuals also employ cognitive heuristics (flawed problem 
solving techniques) that interfere with how they process information 
about environmental harms. This can prevent them from acting in an 
                                                           
 48. Carlson, supra note 15, at 1243 (“[If] others engage in the behavior necessary to achieve 
the collective good, [one] can free ride on their efforts and still gain the benefits of their behavior.”). 
 49. The European Union, and Germany in particular, has taken a multi-pronged approach to 
getting individuals to reduce the amount of energy they consume. See generally Thomas Daniel 
Wuertenber, The Regulation of CO2 Emissions Caused by Private Households – An Analysis of the 
Legal Situation in the European Union and Germany, 16 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1 (2009) 
(describing the various initiatives, including command and control regulations, loans, subsidies, 
metering, and labeling being undertaken by the European Union and Germany to regulate carbon 
dioxide emissions by individuals). Interestingly, the United States may be taking a step toward the 
European Union’s command and control model with the introduction of the Appliance Standards 
Improvement Act of 2009 in the Senate, one provision of which phases out the use of incandescent 
light bulbs in portable light fixtures. See Ari Natter, Energy Efficiency: Senate Legislation on 
Appliance Standards Draws Fire from Energy Department, EPA, 40 Env’t. Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 
679 (Mar. 27, 2009). 
 50. See Babcock, supra note 4, at 124-34 (discussing barriers to changing personal behavior). 
 51. See id. at 125-26. 
 52. See id. at 130-31. 
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environmentally benign way.53 Often individuals resist changing their 
behavior because they disbelieve the reason for the behavior change or 
they question the legitimacy of the norm underlying the change.54 There 
are also social norms like the autonomy and reciprocity norms that get in 
the way of the environmental protection norm, the compliance with law 
norm, and the personal responsibility norm, norms which might 
otherwise encourage good environmental behavior.55 
There is one other barrier to good environmental behavior that 
particularly impedes compliance with the energy conservation norm. 
Thus, to the extent individuals depend on enhancing their own self worth 
or earning the esteem of others to motivate good behavior, conserving 
energy in their homes, for example by turning off lights or changing 
light bulbs, means they will not receive the positive regard of their 
neighbors and friends because no one will observe their actions.56 “The 
evidence suggests that esteem matters; many individuals care what 
others think of them.”57 If external praise is not there, then it is less 
likely that an individual will feel proud of her good behavior and will 
engage in it.58 
B. Structural Problems with CFLs 
There are specific structural problems with CFLs that trigger the 
general barriers to individuals conserving energy by changing light 
bulbs. Some of these problems relate to the cost of CFLs and others to 
                                                           
 53. Id. at 127-29 (discussing how people overestimate their knowledge about a particular 
problem, make stereotypical decisions and then self-select information to support those conclusions, 
simplify complexities, suffer from both alarmist and optimistic biases which affect how they assess 
the probability of an event occurring, and generally filter out ordinary activities). 
 54. See Christopher A. Deabler, The Normative and Legal Deficiencies of “Public Morality,” 
19 J.L. & POL. 23, 34-35 (2003) (“Though we may be motivated to adopt certain normative 
frameworks, they have to be justified cognitively to ourselves if they are to legitimately govern 
behavior. This framework must consist of a justification of norms generally and the justification of 
their societal implementation.”). 
 55. See Babcock, supra note 4, at 151-52 (discussing how these norms can block compliance 
with the environmental protection norm). 
 56. Carlson, supra note 15, at 1299-1300 (noting that “face-to-face contact and behavioral 
feedback” increase the opportunities to signal or gain esteem). Changing light bulbs can be 
contrasted with curbside recycling where the visibility of the action plays an important role in 
engaging in it. See id. at 1279 (“To the extent that garnering neighbors’ esteem or signaling one’s 
reputation motivates a potential recycler, visible curbside recycling is a wonderful tool . . . . Those 
who do not recycle are visible noncooperators.”). 
 57. Id. at 1290. “Cooperative behavior typically increases when opportunities to communicate 
esteem (or lack of it) increase . . . .” Id. 
 58. See id. at 1283 (noting a positive “correlation” between the level of recycling intensity 
and the extent to which “an individual feels . . . proud about being environmentally responsible” 
(citing Daniel Scott, Equal Opportunity, Unequal Results: Determinants of Household Recycling 
Intensity, 31 ENV’T & BEHAV. 267, 284 (1999))). 
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inconvenience;59 still others are uniquely associated with the product’s 
design features.60 While CFL technology “has improved in the last 
decade, the bulbs do not replicate the performance of incandescents, the 
bulbs to which most people are accustomed.”61 These problems with 
CFLs can neutralize any guilt an individual may feel about not 
conforming to the energy conservation norm, which might otherwise 
propel her to switch bulbs.62 
For example, CFLs can be three to ten times more expensive than 
traditional incandescent light bulbs, which can dissuade even the most 
ardent adherent to the energy conservation norm from acquiring them.63 
It takes longer for a CFL to start up than a conventional incandescent 
bulb, most of them buzz, and many people find the color of the light they 
emit and their shape objectionable.64 CFLs also get dimmer over time65 
and can damage textiles and fabrics that contain light-sensitive dyes or 
pigments.66 Because CFLs offer consumers a lighting alternative that 
they perceive as not furthering their self-interest due to the bulbs’ cost 
                                                           
 59. See Carlson, supra note 15, at 1296 (“Increasing convenience seems more effective than 
most persuasive techniques aimed at increasing participation[,] . . . [and it] appears to result in 
sustained behavioral change.”). 
 60. See Leora Broydo Vestel, The Bulb That Saved the Planet May Be a Little Less Than 
Billed, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2009, at A1 (recounting problems that purchasers of CFLs are 
encountering and saying that people who thought they could save the planet by screwing in a CFL 
“are finding the new compact fluorescent bulbs anything but simple”). 
 61. Tom Zeller Jr., Some Special Handling Required, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2009, at A12. 
 62. Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance, supra note 16, at 83 (noting that guilt is the primary 
“internal enforcement mechanism” inhibiting norm violations); see also id. at 85 (noting that the 
possibility that there may be confusion about the desired specific behavior may make any norm of 
good environmental behavior ambiguous, which can lessen the guilt an offender might otherwise 
feel from her deviant behavior). 
 63. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, Residential Buildings, 
http://www1.eere.energy.gov/buildings/residential/lighting.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2009); see also 
Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 97 
(2001) (stating that “the extent to which consumers will in fact pay more for ‘green’ products and 
services is unclear”). 
 64. STEFAN FASSBINDER, LEONARDO ENERGY, HOW EFFICIENT ARE COMPACT 
FLUORESCENT LAMPS? 8 (2008), available at http://www.leonardo-energy.org/webfm_send/219; 
L.J. SANDHAL ET AL., PAC. NW. NAT’L LAB., COMPACT FLUORESCENT LIGHTING IN AMERICA: 
LESSONS LEARNED ON THE WAY TO MARKET 2.1, 2.3 (2006), available at 
http://www.pnl.gov/main/publications/external/technical_reports/PNNL-15730.pdf. 
 65. H. STERLING BURNETT & AMANDA BERG, NAT’L CTR. FOR POLICY ANALYSIS, LIGHTS 
OUT FOR THOMAS EDISON 1 (2008), http://www.ncpa.org/pdfs/ba637.pdf. 
 66. See M. Khazova & J.B. O’Hagan, Optical Radiation Emissions from Compact 
Fluorescent Lamps, 131 RADIATION PROTECTION DOSIMETRY 521, 521 (2008), available at 
http://rpd.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/131/4/521.pdf (noting that CFLs produce small amounts of 
ultraviolet radiation); U.S. GEN. SERVS. ADMIN., CARE AND MAINTENANCE: RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR ARTWORK IN THE FINE ARTS COLLECTION § 3.4 (2005), available at 
http://www.gsa.gov/graphics/pbs/GSA_FineArts_3_Textiles.pdf (discussing ways by which to 
protect textiles from ultraviolet light sources, including fluorescent lights). 
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and unsatisfactory attributes, it is less likely that they will replace their 
inexpensive, perfectly satisfactory incandescent bulbs.67 
These problems might be overcome by buying the right bulb, but 
the packaging information about CFL performance is too technical and 
hard for the average consumer to understand.68 Consumers need the 
equivalent of a Rosetta stone to decipher the differences among CFLs 
with respect to the quality of their light, their cost, and turn-on-time to 
figure out which CFL each should select.69 
Another problem with CFLs is that each CFL bulb contains an 
average of four milligrams of mercury.70 Although a naturally occurring 
element, human exposure to high levels of mercury can damage the 
brain, heart, kidneys, and immune system;71 while birds and mammals 
exposed to high levels of methylmercury72 can experience reduced 
reproduction, retarded growth, abnormal behavior, and even death.73 The 
presence of mercury means that used or damaged CFLs should be 
specially recycled and not disposed of in the garbage where they would 
end up in a landfill or in a waste incinerator.74 However, to date, there 
are very few sites where CFLs can be recycled;75 most of these locations 
can only be found by going online.76 The need to recycle CFLs adds to 
                                                           
 67. See Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV, supra note 16, at 521 n.13 (“Research on 
seat belt use, smoking, and other behaviors suggests that major shifts can occur where the behavior 
change will benefit the individual. Where the harms of an individual’s behavior are externalized, or 
where habits or other barriers exist to self-interested change, influencing behavior may be far more 
difficult.”). 
 68. See Vestel, supra note 60 (quoting a consumer of a CFL as saying, “We’re both college-
educated and pay attention to labels[, but] . . . [i]t feels like someone forgot to put a place to find the 
information.”). 
 69. Id.; see also Zeller, supra note 61 (finding the statement by experts at Rensselaer 
Polytechnic Institute that CFLs required “a little insight and planning” to be an “understatement”). 
 70. ENERGY STAR, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: INFORMATION ON COMPACT 
FLORESCENT LIGHT BULBS (CFLS) AND MERCURY 1 (2008), http://www.energystar.gov/ia/ 
partners/promotions/change_light/downloads/Fact_Sheet_Mercury.pdf. 
 71. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Mercury: Basic Information, http://www.epa.gov/mercury/ 
about.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2009). 
 72. Methylmercury is produced when mercury in the air is deposited in water where “certain 
microorganisms can change it into methylmercury, a highly toxic form [of mercury] that builds up 
in fish, shellfish[,] and animals that eat fish.” Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See Energy Star, Answers: What Are the Mercury Emissions Caused by Humans? Do 
CFLs that End Up in a Landfill Contribute to These Emissions?, http://energystar.custhelp.com/cgi-
bin/energystar.cfg/php/enduser/std_adp.php?p_faqid=5411&p_created=1220627774 (last visited 
Oct. 20, 2009) (stating that the EPA estimates that if all 290 million CFLs sold in 2007 were sent to 
landfill sites, only 0.1%, or 0.13 metric tons, of mercury emissions would be added to the United 
States’ annual average of 104 tons). 
 75. See, e.g., Stephanie Rosenbloom, Home Depot Offers Recycling for Compact Fluorescent 
Bulbs, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2008, at C1 (stating that only two percent of CFLs are recycled). 
 76. See, e.g., U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Mercury-Containing Light Bulb (Lamp) Collection 
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their inconvenience. 
Even though, in theory, the mercury from damaged or improperly 
disposed of CFLs is offset by the reduction in mercury emissions from 
power plants because of CFL use,77 improper disposal of CFLs does 
release mercury into the environment.78 The mercury in CFLs poses 
additional problems should one break in the home where the amount of 
mercury released under those circumstances can exceed EPA guidelines 
for chronic exposure to mercury.79 A broken CFL triggers complex 
cleaning procedures, including clearing the room of people and pets and 
sealing broken bulbs in plastic before disposal.80 Mercury in CFLs 
additionally creates a conflict between the norms of energy conservation 
and environmental protection.81 A conflict between norms makes it 
difficult for even the most ardent environmentalist to figure out what the 
“right” action is.82 
Therefore, despite their obvious economic benefit to the individual 
and wider social benefit of reducing energy consumption, getting 
individuals to make the effort, spend the money, and adopt what could 
be seen as the less appealing option of swapping out their light bulbs for 
CFLs is not a frictionless endeavor. Nonetheless, it still may be easier to 
get individuals to replace a single incandescent light with a CFL than to 
turn off lights or to refrain from buying electronic appliances, which 
                                                           
and Recycling Programs Where You Live, http://www.epa.gov/epawaste/hazard/wastetypes/ 
universal/lamps/live.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2009) (providing links to sites where damaged or 
worn out bulbs can be recycled). 
 77. Energy Star, Compact Florescent Light Bulbs (CFLs) and Mercury, 
http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=cfls.pr_cfls_mercury (last visited Oct. 20, 2009). Based on 
the United States’ coal usage, the power consumed by a CFL is estimated to amount to 1.2 
milligrams of mercury released into the environment; whereas a conventional incandescent light 
bulb results in the release of 5.8 milligrams of mercury. ENERGY STAR, supra note 70, at 1. In areas 
of the country where electricity is generated by coal fired power plants, the savings in electricity 
would more than offset the mercury released by these bulbs when they are discarded in landfills. Id. 
 78. Energy Star, supra note 77. 
 79. DEB STAHLER ET AL., ME. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., MAINE COMPACT FLUORESCENT 
LAMP STUDY 7-9, 25-26 (2008), available at http://maine.gov/dep/rwm/homeowner/ 
cflreport/cflreport.pdf. There seems to be some uncertainty about the health impacts on sensitive 
subpopulations at these levels as well as the ability to remove mercury from carpeting and how to 
dispose of broken CFLs. Id. at 9 & n.10, 40-41, 63-66. 
 80. See Zeller, supra note 61 (“If you break a bulb, the Environmental Protection Agency 
recommends precautions to avoid mercury exposure: Clear people and pets from the room and open 
a window for at least 15 minutes if possible. Avoid vacuuming. Scoop up larger pieces with stiff 
paper or cardboard, pick up smaller residue with sticky tape, and wipe the area with a damp cloth. 
Put everything into a sealed plastic bag or sealed glass jar.”). 
 81. See Babcock, supra note 4, at 152 (discussing what happens when there are conflicting 
norms). 
 82. Alex Williams, That Buzz in Your Ear May Be Green Noise, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2008, 
at ST1 (“Trying to do right by the environment means sorting through the conflicting din.”). 
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make our lives so much more convenient and pleasant,83 even though the 
social and individual benefits of the latter, in terms of reduced electricity 
use, may be greater. 
This Article now turns to the three approaches mentioned 
previously—smart meters, comparative billing, and personal 
incentives—to see if the motivational techniques buried in each of them 
can overcome the obstacles that prevent individuals from adhering to the 
energy conservation norm by purchasing CFLs.84 
C. Identifying and Assessing the Success of Different Approaches to 
Overcoming Behavioral and Structural Barriers to Using CFLs 
This section of the Article examines three possible approaches to 
getting people to reduce their energy consumption by switching to CFLs. 
Two of these approaches, smart meters and comparative billing, are 
already in use in some areas of the country.85 The third, personal 
incentives, has not been applied to reduce energy consumption, but has 
been used in a variety of other areas to get people to change their 
behavior. Each approach is separately explored below by identifying and 
evaluating the effectiveness of their motivational mechanisms.  
1. Smart Meters 
Smart meters are a part of the so-called “smart grid,” a computer-
based network of “sensors and control devices on the nation’s high-
voltage transmission networks, coupled with instantaneous 
communications among grid managers, generators and customers.”86 
The electric power grid currently is a patchwork of individual and 
regional transmission systems that has been compared to “your 
grandmother’s patchwork quilt, and is about as frayed[,]” and it costs 
electricity consumers billions of dollars a year because of congestion and 
                                                           
 83. See supra note 34 (discussing the strength of habits). 
 84. Stern, supra note 34, at 561-62 (stating that getting people to curtail their behavior is 
“challenging because it requires continuing reinforcement” unlike a decision to buy a new appliance 
which “requires only a one-time incentive”). 
 85. See, e.g., Leslie Kaufman, Utilities Turn Their Customers Green, with Envy, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 31, 2009, at A1 (discussing cities such as Sacramento, Chicago, and Seattle who use 
comparative billing methods); Posting of Erik Olsen to Green Inc. Blog, http:// 
greeninc.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/10/07/smart-meters-open-market-for-smart-apps/ (Oct. 7, 2008, 
16:19 EST) (stating that smart meter programs are underway in Southern California, Oklahoma, and 
Western Arkansas). 
 86. Peter Behr, Technology: The Smart Grid, an ‘Internet for Electricity,’ vs. Business as 
Usual, CLIMATEWIRE, Feb. 27, 2009, http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/print/2009/02/27/4. It will 
cost billions of dollars to “[s]marten [u]p” the nation’s electric power grid and require a “‘major 
paradigm shift’” in how people consume electricity. Slevin & Mufson, supra note 11. 
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resultant power outages.87 The current grid needs to be modernized 
before anything like smart meters can be effectively used. 
Smart meters audit energy consumption in greater detail than 
conventional meters.88 They are designed to give the utilities real time 
information about their customers’ use of electricity.89 This information 
is transmitted to the local utility for monitoring90 and billing purposes. In 
the future, smart meters will tell consumers when power is the cheapest 
and will even be able start an appliance automatically or turn it off 
during a period of peak electricity demand.91 
Smart meters have taken time to catch hold in this country, but 
programs to deploy them are now underway in several cities.92 For 
example, Southern California Edison recently announced its intention to 
“install . . . 5.3 million meters between 2009 and 2012 at a cost [to the 
utility] of $1.63 billion.”93 Oklahoma Gas & Electric, which serves 
765,000 customers in Oklahoma and western Arkansas, has joined 
forces with a network of hardware and software providers and a 
company that provides Web-based energy monitoring software to help 
the utility’s customers lower their energy use and thus lower their 
monthly bills.94 Duke Energy has allocated over one billion dollars over 
the next five years to install smart meters and other upgrades to its 
system.95 
However, most of the smart meters now in use do not give 
residential electricity users information on their individual use.96 One 
                                                           
 87. Slevin & Mufson, supra note 11. 
 88. Posting of Erik Olsen, supra note 85.  
 89. Id. This discussion does not include the associated environmental costs of producing and 
disposing of smart meters. 
 90. Id. This information helps utilities monitor the distribution of power in its system and thus 
hopefully avoid blackouts or other disruptions of electrical service due to higher than anticipated 
use. Slevin & Mufson, supra note 11. 
 91. Slevin & Mufson, supra note 11. 
 92. A program on Washington’s Olympic Peninsula that installed various sensors and meters 
in 110 homes that allowed people to adjust their thermostats when electrical prices were high saw a 
drop of ten percent in their monthly electrical bills and the system’s peak load went down about 
fifteen percent. Id. Showing a surprising communitarian spirit when these same customers were told 
that cutting back on their electric power usage during a major storm would assure that there would 
be some power for all, demand dropped to fifty percent of normal levels. Id. 
 93. Posting of Erik Olsen, supra note 85. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Slevin & Mufson, supra note 11. 
 96. Giving utilities intelligence about an individual household’s electricity consumption has 
engendered “‘a fair amount of skepticism’” about whether that information will benefit the utility or 
its customers. Phil Taylor, Electricity: Will Americans Learn to Love ‘Smart Grid’?, GREENWIRE, 
Feb. 27, 2009, http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/print/2009/02/27/1. In an effort to explain 
customers’ skepticism, one power industry executive stated that “‘[a] lot of people wonder if this is 
another thing that’s going to benefit the utility at the expense of the consumer.’” Id. 
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exception to this is Oklahoma Gas & Electric, which not only provides 
this information directly to its customers, but also includes information 
on how the customers’ neighbors are doing.97 Google is promoting a 
particular type of smart meter that will display information online 
“almost in real time” for its customers.98 Google is lobbying Washington 
and other public agencies to invest in smart meters with the hopes that 
140 million homes will be equipped with their meters in the next few 
years.99 
The assumption behind smart meters is that individuals do not 
currently have information that makes them aware of how much energy 
they are using, and that if they had that information, they would reduce 
their use of electricity either because they want to lower their monthly 
bills or because, as environmentally responsible individuals, they want 
to reduce harmful emissions from coal-fired power plants. Thus, 
information is the persuasive tool that smart meters employ, which puts 
a premium on the effectiveness of the information that tells consumers 
about their excessive use of electricity.100 Although my prior work 
emphasizes the importance of information in changing personal 
behavior, that work also recognizes the limits of information as a solitary 
motivational force.101 Some of these constraints are set forth below.  
For example, individuals have a hard time accurately processing 
environmental information pertaining to environmental risks, and they 
use a variety of heuristics, which can distort the information’s accuracy 
and thwart its intended purpose.102 These flawed problem solving 
                                                           
 97. Posting of Erik Olsen, supra note 85. A variation on this idea is being promoted by Xcel 
Energy to its customers in Colorado, which allows its customers to go online and calculate the 
amount of carbon dioxide emitted to meet their individual electrical power and heating needs. Xcel 
has 1.6 million customers in the state. But even Xcel admits that “[c]ustomers may choose when 
they have that information to use less energy as a way to make personal choices around their carbon 
footprint.” Andy Vuong, The Power Behind Figuring Footprint: Xcel Customers Will Soon Be Able 
to Calculate Carbon-Dioxide Emissions, DENVER POST, Feb. 16, 2009, at A-23. 
98. Posting of Ed Lu to Google Blog, http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2009/02/power-to-
people.html (Feb. 9, 2009, 20:39 EST). 
 99. Id. 
 100. See Slevin & Mufson, supra note 11 (quoting the Chief Executive of Southern Company, 
“[j]ust because you plug in a smart meter . . . doesn’t mean a customer will immediately take smart 
actions”). 
 101. See Babcock, supra note 4, at 165-70; Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of Deterrence 
in Tort Law, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 115, 163 (1993) (stating that the task of educating the public to 
accurately calculate the risks of their behavior seems “insurmountable”). But see Bill Marsh, A 
Battle Between the Bottle and the Faucet, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2007, at WK14 (quoting Emily 
Lloyd, Commissioner of New York City’s Department of Environmental Protection, saying that 
“[t]hrough education and motivation you can get people to change their habits,” in this case, 
switching from environmentally harmful bottled water to tap water). 
 102. See Babcock, supra note 4, at 127-28 (discussing various problems people have 
processing information, including selecting information that will support some stereotypical 
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techniques may make it difficult for individuals to relate their rate of 
energy consumption as reflected on their monthly bill, let alone 
changing a light bulb, to a reduction in greenhouse gases and then to 
global sea level rise, both of which are geographically and temporally 
distant. Information about environmental harms and the cause of those 
harms is frequently contested; the sources may not be seen as credible 
because they have a vested interest in a particular outcome, like the 
manufacturers of CFLs who want to sell bulbs, and the information is 
often complex and frequently highly technical.103 
The complexity and volume of information about environmental 
harms make it extremely difficult to convey the magnitude of a 
particular environmental risk—here, the need to reduce energy 
consumption because of the associated environmental and even national 
security concerns.104 Too much information can lead to information 
overload, or “green fatigue,”105 and the marginalization of information 
about environmental harm, causing people to tune out the message.106 To 
the extent that purchasing CFLs is tied to global climate change, the 
potential consumer finds herself bombarded with information, often 
conflicting, about the phenomenon, requiring her to make the seemingly 
improbable leap from a single CFL to shrinking glaciers, as noted 
previously. Additionally, the climate change debate is becoming 
increasingly shrill and dominated by advocates on both sides of the issue 
who seek to simplify the message and use alarmist language, often with 
                                                           
conclusion they have reached); see also Stewart, supra note 63, at 141 (“Even if perfectly collected 
and disseminated, [information as a regulatory tool] depends on the willingness and ability of 
individuals to properly process the information provided accurately and to act on it. People have 
limited time, energy, and attention . . . . Also, people use heuristics, including those based on their 
prior experiences, to process information and deal with uncertainty. Their perceptions of risks are 
affected by socioeconomic variables and by their psychological saliency and accessibility may 
produce significant distortions.”). 
 103. See Martha C. Monroe, Two Avenues for Encouraging Conservation Behaviors, 10 HUM. 
ECOLOGY REV. 113, 119 (2003). (“Durable behavior, which is the result of effortful information 
processing (i.e. elaboration), is more achievable when cognitive involvement is high, arguments are 
strong, sources are credible, topics are relevant, message is clear, distractions are few, and 
comparisons are favorable.”). 
 104. Stewart, supra note 63, at 141 (“Environmental problems are inherently complex and are 
often characterized by significant uncertainties. Yet, efforts to communicate fully such complexities 
and uncertainties would produce information overload, leading people to simply disregard or 
discount the communication or distort it through simplification.”). 
 105. Williams, supra note 82. 
 106. Stewart, supra note 63, at 140; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and 
Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 627 (1999) (“With respect to 
information, less may be more. If information is not provided in a clear and usable form, it may 
actually make people less knowledgeable than they were before, producing overreactions, or 
underreactions, based on an ability to understand what the information actually means.”). 
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negative effects on the listener.107 
The content of information and the context in which it is presented 
are critical for information to be effective.108 With respect to 
environmental information, it is particularly important that the 
information’s content connect an individual’s behavior to whatever the 
environmental problem is and show how a change in that behavior may 
diminish the problem.109 It also helps if the information shows that other 
people in similar situations are “doing their fair share”110 and that 
behaving in a more environmentally responsible way will not make the 
individual look like a “sucker.”111 Those requirements are difficult to 
satisfy here. Connecting a single light bulb to global climate change is 
challenging for even the most knowledgeable consumer, while the cost 
and intrusiveness of collecting information about other people’s 
behavior112 and the fact that people change light bulbs in the privacy of 
the home means there is no way of knowing if anyone else is engaging 
in the same activity. 
For information to change behavior, it must, among other things, 
“resonate[] with the values of the recipient,”113 come from a trusted 
source,114 and inform the individual of what the correct behavior is.115 
Again, information as a motivational tool to change the level at which 
individuals consume energy is in trouble. The extent to which energy 
conservation information does not resonate with the values of those who 
measure their self-worth by material consumption may create a problem 
                                                           
 107. See Vandenbergh, supra note 34, at 1138 (complaining that alarmist language “can have a 
‘boomerang effect’”); Stewart, supra note 63, at 139-40 (noting a problem with negative 
information, such as “disclosure of health risks,” is that they are “uninformative (because they fail 
to convey the magnitude of the risks posed by different substances) and alarmist,” and that “too 
much information may overwhelm consumers, or simply cause them to disregard it entirely”). 
 108. See Shuman, supra note 101, at 162 (“[P]eople tend to evaluate information based upon 
the way the information is framed.”). Cf. Vandenbergh, supra note 34, at 1134-35 (commenting on 
the ineffectiveness of eco-labels and stating “several studies have concluded that eco-labels have 
little effect on consumer behavior[,] . . . unless most or all other factors (e.g., the price and quality 
of the good) are equal”). 
 109. Vandenbergh, supra note 34, at 1123-24. 
 110. Id. at 1124. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 1123 (“[G]athering information on the contribution of any one individual often is 
prohibitively expensive and intrusive.”). 
 113. P. Wesley Schultz & Lynnette Zelezny, Reframing Environmental Messages to be 
Congruent with American Values, 10 HUM. ECOLOGY REV. 126, 134 (2003); see also id. at 131 
(criticizing environmental messages for stressing altruism because they ask people “to give up 
personal convenience or comfort in order to address the problem”). 
 114. Paul C. Stern, Understanding Individuals’ Environmentally Significant Behavior, 35 
ENVTL. L. REP. 10785, 10789 (2005). 
 115. Carlson, supra note 15, at 1296-97 (explaining that face-to-face communication and 
feedback mechanisms result in greater norm compliance than the provision of information). 
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for those individuals. People who do not trust utilities as a source of 
information may summarily reject utility-sponsored information.116 The 
problem of trust is aggravated here because utilities have a direct interest 
in getting people to use smart meters as a way of reducing discretionary 
energy consumption; otherwise they must either buy power in the spot 
market during periods of peak demand or build expensive new power 
plants that often are not used except during heavy energy use.117 
Many of these problems with relying on information to persuade 
consumers to reduce the amount of energy they consume by switching 
the type of light bulbs they use can be overcome, for example, by 
carefully crafting the message to point out the immediate direct benefit 
to the consumer of lower electricity bills. This is especially true where 
consumers are already environmentally socialized—that is, already 
adherents of the norm of individual environmentally responsible 
behavior and practitioners of other good environmental behavior like 
recycling.118 Although it may be difficult for individuals to appreciate 
that changing one light bulb can help reduce emissions of greenhouse 
gases and thus help save drowning polar bears, information showing this 
connection is readily available and accessible to the layperson.119 
Connecting a desired new behavior (conserving electricity by changing 
light bulbs) with behaviors that are already popular (protecting iconic 
species like polar bears) can give a boost to the new behavior.120 
In the case of electricity consumption, utilities already have 
information about how much electricity their customers are using, so 
there is no additional cost for collection, nor is there any additional 
intrusion on personal privacy.121 It is also easy for utilities to present that 
information in a way that puts their customers’ behavior in the context of 
the behavior of other customers or to include bill stuffers that tell stories 
                                                           
 116. See Taylor, supra note 96 (attributing the public’s loss of trust in utilities to the rate 
increases that happened simultaneously with deregulation). 
 117. Slevin & Mufson, supra note 11. 
 118. Stewart, supra note 63, at 135 (stating that environmental socialization information can 
create a “demand in favor of environmentally friendly products”). 
 119. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of converting a 
single incandescent bulb to a CFL). 
 120. See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 1009 
(1995); see also Vandenbergh, supra note 34, at 1163 (“[I]nformation about the dioxin released 
from backyard burning may be necessary to generate the public support for community-wide 
garbage collection or to fund public information campaigns that inform individuals about materials 
that should not be burned in backyard barrels.”). 
 121. Of course sharing information about individual consumption of electricity with others 
runs the risk of violating the privacy norm, which is held in high esteem in this country. See 
Babcock, supra note 4, at 159. 
962 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:943 
about what people are doing to reduce their electricity consumption.122 
This would avoid the problem of people feeling like dupes, if they 
engage in the desired behavior. 
Other problems may not be overcome so easily. No amount of 
information, even information that shows that mercury emissions from 
power plants are greater than from a single broken or poorly disposed of 
CFL, is likely to overcome an individual consumer’s concern about the 
mercury released when that CFL breaks in her home. The direct and 
immediate cost of purchasing a CFL compared to a traditional 
incandescent bulb will have greater impact on individual consumers than 
a reduction in their monthly utility bills because of how people discount 
future costs.123 Utilities and manufacturers of bulbs like General Electric 
have not been trusted as reliable sources of environmental information 
because they have been a major source of environmental problems and 
will be seen as direct beneficiaries of any campaign to sell CFLs.124 And 
finally, the sheer complexity and amount of technical information 
involved in selecting the right CFL for a particular consumer, their 
physical unattractiveness, and the inconvenience of both acquiring and 
disposing of them cannot be overcome by information alone, even if tied 
to another appealing image, such as saving polar bears. 
This means that to the extent that smart meters depend on the 
information they convey to reduce the amount of electricity individuals 
consume, they may not be able to achieve that goal by getting their 
customers to buy CFLs because information as a motivational tool is too 
problematic. 
2. Comparative Consumer Information 
Like the smart meter method, this approach also relies on 
information to persuade utility customers to decrease their use of 
electricity. However, the way in which the information is presented to 
the customer invokes additional motivators of personal action: the 
conformity norm, competition, and, to some extent, the use of shame. 
Both Oklahoma Gas & Electric and Sacramento Municipal Utility 
                                                           
 122. This approach is discussed in greater detail in the next part of the Article. See infra Part 
III.C.2. 
 123. See Cass R. Sunstein, Precautions Against What? The Availability Heuristic and Cross-
Cultural Risk Perception, 57 ALA. L. REV. 75, 89 (2005) (discussing the “availability heuristic” and 
how peoples’ perceptions of risks are influenced by whether the risk is “cognitively available”); see 
also Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 841, 870-71, 875 (2006) 
(stating that people are likely to “treat the risk as essentially zero” and pay little to prevent it, 
especially when “the costs of precautions are incurred immediately” while its “benefits will not be 
enjoyed until decades later”). 
 124. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text. 
2009] COMPACT FLUORESCENT BULBS 963 
District (“SMUD” or “the Utility”) are trying to motivate their 
residential customers to reduce energy consumption by giving them 
information not only about their own use of electricity, but also 
information about how much electricity their neighbors are using.125 
SMUD’s residential customers receive monthly bills that compare their 
level of energy consumption against one hundred of their neighbors who 
live in comparable size homes and who use the same heating fuel.126 The 
monthly statement also contains information that separately compares 
the household’s level of energy consumption with twenty neighbors who 
have been singled out because of their efficiency in conserving 
energy.127 The Utility resorted to this tactic after years of trying to get its 
customers to reduce energy use through other tactics, such as offering 
rebates for energy saving appliances.128 SMUD customers who received 
these personalized reports in their bills reduced their energy use by two 
percent compared to those who were sent standard statements.129 
SMUD’s success has prompted utilities in ten other major metropolitan 
areas, including Chicago and Seattle, to adopt the same program.130 
Oklahoma Gas & Electric, as mentioned earlier, provides similar 
comparative information on energy use within a neighborhood.131 
The use of comparative billing information taps into the conformity 
norm.132 “‘It is fundamental and primitive . . . . The mere perception of 
the normal behavior of those around us is very powerful.’”133 The 
conformity norm134 arises because “people ‘frequently use the beliefs, 
attitudes, and actions of others, particularly similar others, as a standard 
                                                           
 125. See Kaufman, supra note 85 (describing SMUD’s program); Posting of Erik Olsen, supra 
note 85. 
 126. See Kaufman, supra note 85. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. (reporting on a 2004 experiment by Robert Cialdini, a social psychologist at Arizona 
State, where the only message left hanging on doorknobs in a middle-class San Diego suburban 
neighborhood that had a significant effect on reducing energy consumption was the one that said the 
individual’s neighbors had already taken steps to reduce energy consumption; messages exhorting 
people to save the earth or even save money had no significant effect). 
 129. Id.  
 130. Id. 
 131. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 132. A shorthand way of describing the conformity norm is “[i]f everyone is doing it, it must 
be a sensible thing to do.” Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance, supra note 16, at 112 n.198. Like habits, 
the conformity norm “provides an efficient ‘decisional shortcut.’” Id. (quoting Robert B. Cialdini et 
al., A Focus Theory of Normative Conduct: Recycling the Concept of Norms to Reduce Littering in 
Public Places, 58 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1015, 1015 (1990)). 
 133. Kaufman, supra note 85 (quoting Robert Cialdini). Kaufman cites the example of one 
SMUD customer who, after receiving her personal statement, bought a new energy efficient washer 
and dryer, put her lights on timers, and unplugged her “kegerator” (a draft beer cooler) and whose 
energy consumption is now equal to her neighbors. Id. 
 134. Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance, supra note 16, at 112. 
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of comparison against which to evaluate the correctness of their own 
beliefs, attitudes, and actions.’”135 Therefore, one way to increase an 
individual’s good environmental behavior is to provide information on 
how well others are performing the same task as well as feedback on the 
individual’s own performance.136 This is exactly what the two utilities 
are doing. 
The other motivational force that the two utilities have tapped into 
is competition. “‘As Americans, we are good at . . . competition . . . . It’s 
the part of this culture that people really understand . . . .’”137 For 
decades, colleges have encouraged competition, both between different 
schools and among dormitories on the same campus, in an effort to 
reduce overall energy consumption.138 Recently, those collegiate 
competitions have become even more intense. For example, at Central 
College in Pella, Iowa, where students, who compete to see which suite 
of rooms in a “green dorm” has the lowest level of energy consumption, 
are going off campus to charge their cell phones.139 Although individual 
homeowners are less likely to compete, various households in three 
Massachusetts towns (Medford, Arlington, and Cambridge) who 
participated in a competitive game called “Energy Smackdown” reduced 
their energy use up to sixty-six percent during the course of the year-
long game.140 One positive result of lifestyle changing games like 
Energy Smackdown is that even after the competition ends, the 
contestants continue to practice good environmental behavior because 
they have formed new habits, which are neither costly nor inconvenient 
to continue.141 
                                                           
 135. Id. at 114 (quoting Robert B. Cialdini, Social Motivations to Comply: Norms, Values, and 
Principles, in 2 TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE 200, 213 (Jeffrey A. Roth & John T. Scholz eds., 1989)); 
see also supra note 132. 
 136. See Carlson, supra note 15, at 1290 (“The evidence suggests that esteem matters; many 
individuals care what others think of them. Cooperative behavior typically increases when 
opportunities to communicate esteem (or lack of it) increase . . . .”). 
 137. Kaufman, supra note 85 (quoting the executive director of the nonprofit responsible for 
the Energy Smackdown program). “Energy Smackdown” is a reality series game designed to 
encourage energy conservation that is shown on local cable TV. Id. The game discussed in the 
article involved ten families from three different Massachusetts communities (Cambridge, Medford, 
and Arlington). Id. 
 138. Another example of environmental competitions between colleges and universities is 
“RecycleMania,” in which schools compete over a ten-week period to reduce the amount of 
resources they use and waste they produce, by transforming a waste reduction message into a 
message any college student can understand—“beating the cross town rival.” RecycleMania, 
http://www.recyclemaniacs.org/overview.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2009). 
 139. Kaufman, supra note 85. 
 140. Id. 
 141. See Dave Copeland, Neighborly Competition: Residents in 3 Communities Try to Outdo 
Each Other in the Energy Smackdown, BOSTON SUNDAY GLOBE, Aug. 17, 2008, at H1. 
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While the conformity norm and competition may inspire 
individuals to improve their energy conservation performance when the 
information about their performance is positive or they win, the 
effectiveness of negative comparative information, or losing, to some 
extent depends on the individual feeling ashamed of her poor 
performance.142 However, shame is an extremely problematic 
motivator.143 On the one hand, fear of embarrassment or public 
humiliation can motivate individuals to obey minor laws like municipal 
ordinances exhorting pet owners to scoop their pet’s poop and not to 
litter, and can encourage individuals to avoid behaviors that may be 
harmful to others.144 On the other hand, there are serious problems with 
using humiliation as a sanction that severely undermines its usefulness, 
especially where what is essentially private behavior (using too much 
electricity) is broadcast to others, as it is in the case of comparative 
billing and energy competitions.145 
At an extreme level, public humiliation can cripple the embarrassed 
individual’s sense of self-esteem146 because they have not only “lowered 
[themselves] . . . in [their] own eyes” but also “in the eyes of other 
people.”147 There can be negative spillover effects on the offender’s 
immediate family, who may have played a limited role in the offending 
behavior.148 Additionally, using public humiliation to shame a profligate 
                                                           
 142. See Carlson, supra note 15, at 1299-1300 (suggesting that neighborhood recycling 
competitions would not be effective to increase recycling if individuals who performed under par 
did not care what their neighbors thought of them). 
 143. See Deni Smith Garcia, Three Worlds Collide: A Novel Approach to the Law, Literature, 
and Psychology of Shame, 6 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 105, 121 (1999) (“Shame, the emotion, 
actually falls along a continuum of emotions ranging from embarrassment on one end to 
mortification on the other.”); see also Babcock, supra note 4, at 159-65 (discussing shame at 
length). 
 144. Peter H. Huang & Christopher J. Anderson, A Psychology of Emotional Legal Decision 
Making: Revulsion and Saving Face in Legal Theory and Practice, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1045, 1064 
(2006) (reviewing MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE 
LAW (2004)); see also Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 
733, 752 (1998) (arguing that when the deterrent value of shaming is added to “the moralizing 
effects of widespread publicity of offenders’ wrongdoing,” shaming performs an educative function 
for the community and thus may contribute to maintaining social order). But see Dan M. Kahan & 
Eric A. Posner, Shaming White-Collar Criminals: A Proposal for Reform of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 365, 373 (1999) (“Shaming produces highly imperfect 
deterrence . . . .”). 
 145. Indicating the sensitivity of individuals to embarrassment or humiliation, SMUD 
discontinued the use of frowny faces to indicate poor energy conservation performance because the 
company received too many complaints about them. See Kaufman, supra note 85. 
 146. Dan M. Kahan, Shaming White Collar Offenders, 12 FED. SENT’G REP. 51, 52 (1999). 
 147. Richard A. Posner & Eric B. Rasmusen, Creating and Enforcing Norms, with Special 
Reference to Sanctions, 19 INT’L. REV. L. & ECON. 369, 371 (1999). 
 148. Joshua Andrix, Note, Negotiated Shame: An Inquiry into the Efficacy of Settlement in 
Imposing Publicity Sanctions on Corporations, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1857, 1870 (2007); Garcia, 
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user of electricity in the eyes of her community seems totally out of 
proportion with the deviant behavior in this situation—the failure to 
conform to the norm of energy conservation—and thus runs the risk of 
violating a bedrock principle of punishment theory: proportionality.149 
In addition, there are practical problems associated with using 
public embarrassment as a way to improve personal behavior in any 
situation, but particularly here. For example, for shame to have a wide 
educative, behavioral changing effect, there must be a community that 
agrees the offender’s actions are bad;150 otherwise public humiliation can 
lead to an increase in bad behavior in a show of solidarity.151 The 
extravagant use of energy referred to earlier in this Article152 makes it 
doubtful that there is wide support for the energy conservation norm, let 
alone support for it in any particular community. There must also be a 
community whose good opinion the offender values and does not want to 
lose.153 In our atomistic culture, this community may not exist.154 Even 
when there are such communities, it is highly unlikely that individuals 
will publicly humiliate a friend or a neighbor for what may seem to 
many as a minor, let alone private matter: wasting electricity. There is 
also a risk that if too many people in a community are being humiliated, 
that is more neighbors are receiving poor report cards from their utilities 
as opposed to good ones, the deterrent value of negative reports will 
drop.155 Enough bad report cards also create little incentive for 
individuals to deviate from what appears to be a norm of poor 
environmental performance, lest they look like a patsy or “dupe.”156 
                                                           
supra note 143, at 118 (“[S]haming is particularly stigmatic to innocent third-party relations given 
the public nature of a shaming.”). 
 149. See Kahan & Posner, supra note 144, at 385 (stating that the severity of shaming’s 
impacts could undermine the goal of making the penalty proportionate to the offense). 
 150. Alex Geisinger, A Group Identity Theory of Social Norms and Its Implications, 78 TUL. L. 
REV. 605, 648 (2004). 
 151. See Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 
1880, 1933 (1991) (arguing that shaming can actually result in an increase in violations). 
 152. See supra notes 18-30 and accompanying text. 
 153. See Garvey, supra note 144, at 753 (“As for general deterrence, much depends on the 
nature of the relevant community. At one extreme, a community may be so atomized that no one 
cares very much about what anyone thinks of anyone else . . . . Shame is unlikely to play a 
significant role in the social life of so thin an association.”); see also Karp, supra note 33, at 316 
(arguing that the effectiveness of shame depends on ostracizing or excluding an individual from a 
community). 
 154. See, e.g., Massaro, supra note 151, at 1916; David A. Skeel, Jr., Corporate Shaming 
Revisited: An Essay for Bill Klein, 2 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 105, 108 (2005) (noting that both 
population diversity and political polarization in the United States pose challenges to the 
effectiveness of shaming). 
 155. Massaro, supra note 151, at 1930-31 (discussing how when shaming sanctions become 
too common, they lose their deterrent value). 
 156. See Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance, supra note 16, at 112 (“[P]erceptions of widespread 
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Therefore, despite some positive attributes of public embarrassment 
as a means of encouraging good environmental behavior, the negative 
qualities of publicly humiliating someone may well overwhelm its 
usefulness as a means of encouraging energy conservation, let alone 
swapping out light bulbs. To the extent that comparative billing depends 
in some circumstances on triggering shame for its effectiveness, 
notwithstanding the power of the conformity norm and competition, the 
negative aspect of shame as a motivational tool may lessen the 
approach’s effectiveness as well. 
3. Personal Incentives 
Personal incentives are a potential third way to encourage 
individuals to buy CFLs;157 the incentives can be economic or non-
economic.158 Economic incentives play to the consumer’s pocket book; 
while the non-economic incentives, like awards or other types of praise, 
are directed at the consumer’s sense of self-esteem or desire for the 
esteem of her community.159 
The goal of giving someone an economic incentive to engage in 
good environmental behavior is to overcome a situation where “the 
payoff” from a public environmental good like clean air, a benefit of 
reducing energy consumption, is “less tangible than direct economic 
gain.”160 The added inducement of money (like a refund), or something 
of value (a redeemable coupon), combined with the self-esteem that is 
generated when one engages in a socially responsible action, can be 
enough to “tip[] the cost-benefit equation” in favor of the desired 
action.161 In fact, economic incentives may be more effective than 
education, other forms of persuasion, or feedback in changing 
                                                           
noncompliance undermine compliance.”); see also id. at 114 (“[C]ooperation decreases if compliers 
view themselves as ‘dupes.’”). 
 157. See Shuman, supra note 101, at 153 (favoring positive rewards over punishment). 
 158. This analysis does not include changes in CFL design, qualities, or initiatives that would 
make their acquisition and disposal easier. See supra notes 59-78 and accompanying text (noting 
several design problems that inhibit more widespread use of CFLs). As discussed later in this 
Article, these may be the only changes that will induce people into swapping out their light bulbs. 
See infra notes 185-89 and accompanying text. 
 159. If giving people an economic incentive so that they have more money in their pocket or a 
redeemable coupon at Starbucks is viewed as increasing their opportunities, then this may make it 
more likely that they will make a moral commitment to engage in the desired behavior. See Robert 
D. Cooter, Three Effects of Social Norms on Law: Expression, Deterrence, and Internalization, 79 
OR. L. REV. 1, 19 (2000) (stating that when people see a large enough increase in their opportunities 
they are more likely to make moral commitments). 
 160. Carlson, supra note 15, at 1250. 
 161. See id. at 1294 (arguing that the deposit money people receive for returning bottles and 
the “psychic benefit of recycling[] tips the cost-benefit equation”). 
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behavior.162 
While the monthly reduction in an individual’s electric bill from the 
use of a more efficient light bulb should be a sufficient economic 
incentive to buy CFLs, clearly it is not because individuals are still not 
purchasing them. Therefore, additional economic encouragement may be 
necessary. For example, stores where CFLs are sold could issue coupons 
for something other than a CFL, redeemable either at the place the 
purchase was made or some place else, like Starbucks, a local restaurant, 
or a movie theater. Retailers could also refund a portion of the purchase 
price of a CFL, issue redeemable coupons for the purchase of 
replacement bulbs, or offer a reduced price when more than one bulb is 
purchased.163 
There are problems, however, with using economic incentives to 
motivate individuals to make good environmental choices like 
purchasing CFLs. Offering individuals an economic reward for engaging 
in good behavior can “undermine or ‘crowd out’ intrinsic motivation” to 
do a good thing.164 Using economic incentives may also weaken the 
personal or communal psychological advantages of carrying out a 
supportive action and thereby deter the intended behavior.165 But if the 
economic incentive is designed not to be too coercive or controlling166 
and is proportionate to the desired task,167 intrinsic motivation may not 
                                                           
 162. Stern, supra note 34, at 562. But see Carlson, supra note 15, at 1299-1300 (“The most 
effective techniques for increasing norm compliance, face-to-face contact and behavioral feedback, 
play on the human desire to be well-regarded by others. These techniques seem then to work on 
both levels by increasing the opportunities to signal or gather esteem, while simultaneously 
increasing attitudes in favor of the behavior.”). 
 163. See Carlson, supra note 15, at 1298 (“[I]f an activity is already convenient, such as 
residential energy conservation, but requires sustained behavioral change, then individual feedback 
about energy usage may increase compliant behavior, as may rebates for energy efficient 
behavior.”). But see Stewart, supra note 63, at 99 (noting that deposit and refund techniques to 
encourage recycling require people to pay an initial fee when they purchase the item, which is only 
refunded when they properly dispose of the item or return it). 
 164. Stern, supra note 34, at 564. But see id. at 565 (commenting that when people do not have 
an intrinsic motivation to engage in good environmental behavior, a reduction in that motivation is 
irrelevant, and that if the desired new behavior is costly, there is little incentive for people to engage 
in the activity voluntarily). 
 165. Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV, supra note 16, at 608 (“[C]are must be taken to 
ensure that the psychological effects of economic incentives do not undermine their effectiveness. 
For example, in some circumstances financial inducements appear to undermine the psychic 
benefits an individual receives for performing a cooperative act and may discourage, rather than 
encourage, the targeted behavior.”). 
 166. Stern, supra note 34, at 564 (“[R]esearch shows that financial rewards reduce intrinsic 
motivation when the reward is contingent on engaging in an activity, completing a task or, under 
certain conditions, performing well.”); see also id. at 565 (“Rewards are most likely to crowd out 
intrinsic motivation when they are ‘controlling,’ meaning that the recipient experiences the reward 
as pressuring or coercing her actions or controlling the manner, time, or place of the activity.”). 
 167. Id. at 565. 
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be decreased, allowing the individual to feel an increase in self-esteem 
when she engages in the desired activity.168 
Another problem with using economic incentives to spur good 
behavior is that their effect can be short-lived.169 Unless the behavioral 
change (swapping out light bulbs) becomes permanent through the 
internalization of a concrete norm of energy conservation and the new 
behavior becomes a habit, the bad behavior (continuing to buy the 
cheaper, more aesthetically pleasing light bulb) will return the moment 
the incentive (refund, coupon, or discount) is withdrawn.170 In fact, 
empirical studies show that economic incentives only “produce 
moderate, rather than dramatic, effects on individual environmental 
behaviors.”171 
Increasing the price of incandescent bulbs through a surcharge or 
tax might encourage the purchase of CFLs.172 The additional money 
could be applied to assist in recycling worn out or broken CFLs and thus 
lessen the inconvenience associated with disposing of CFLs. Increasing 
the cost of undesirable behavior “tends to reduce the bad behavior and 
increase the good behavior.”173 To the extent that people are sensitive to 
prices, increasing the price of incandescent bulbs could spur people to 
buy CFLs.174 However, raising the price of incandescent bulbs might 
have a regressive impact on lower income consumers, as it might price 
both types of bulbs out of their reach. 
Non-economic incentives, like awards and praise, do not crowd out 
the intrinsic motivation to engage in good behavior and have no 
regressive effect.175 SMUD uses smiley faces on utility bills to reflect 
the success, or lack of success, of each individual household’s efforts to 
                                                           
 168. Id. at 565-66. 
 169. Id. at 562. 
 170. See id. (commenting that the use of a monetary incentive can cause a rapid change in 
behavior, but its withdrawal can end that good behavior just as quickly). This reaction can be as true 
for household energy conservation as it is for carpooling, using public transportation, or recycling. 
Id. 
 171. Id. at 560. Most experiments produce only a ten to thirty percent increase in positive 
environmental behavior across different subject groups. Id. 
 172. But see Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV, supra note 16, at 604-05 (calling 
environmental taxes “politically radioactive”). 
 173. Carlson, supra note 15, at 1297; see also id. (stating that “it may be possible to emulate 
bottle bills in other contexts,” such as using energy efficiency rebates rather than charging for 
“excessive use”). 
 174. See Shankar Vedantam, On Climate, Symbols Can Overshadow Substance, WASH. POST, 
May 17, 2008, at A1 (commenting that people are more sensitive to prices than they are to ethical 
and environmental concerns, and observing that interest in hybrid cars surged when gas reached 
four dollars a gallon). But see Carlson, supra note 15, at 1293 (stating that reducing barriers to 
recycling is more effective than making it more expensive to dispose of garbage). 
 175. Stern, supra note 34, at 565. 
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conserve energy.176 These smiley faces function like a reward, 
comparable to the gold stars children receive from their parents for 
bringing home a good report card or doing household chores, that 
enhances the individual’s self-esteem as well as her standing in the 
community when that information is shared with her neighbors. 
Another example of a non-economic personal incentive that might 
encourage the purchase of CFLs is a public display of the good behavior. 
An example of this might be a bumper sticker recognizing the driver’s 
contribution to fighting global climate change through the purchase of 
CFLs. The CFL bumper sticker would be similar to those extolling the 
car’s occupant for having an “honor roll student” or for supporting a 
particular cause or political candidate.177 Alternatively, the names of 
customers who bought a CFL might be prominently displayed near 
where CFLs are sold, informing a wider audience of their good behavior 
and perhaps, in the process, enticing others to behave the same way so 
they can be part of a similar display.178 
Each of these non-economic incentives not only enhances the 
individual’s self-esteem because others have recognized her good 
environmental behavior, but also raises her community standing because 
she gains her community’s esteem for engaging in responsible 
environmental behavior that benefits the community at large.179 The 
individual so regarded feels good about her selfless act of buying a CFL, 
which increases the likelihood that she might engage in that behavior 
again.180 
                                                           
 176. See Kaufman, supra note 85. The number of smiley faces on a utility bill reflects how 
well the household is doing on energy conservation. Thus, high performance earns two smiley 
faces; while good performance earns one. Id. 
 177. Another example of positive labeling is the “I voted” stickers that inform others of the 
wearer’s good civic behavior. 
 178. Cf. Carlson, supra note 15, at 1294 (“The visibility of returning recyclable containers also 
provides people with good reputation-signaling or esteem-enhancing opportunities.”). 
 179. Cf. Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance, supra note 16, at 116 (commenting on the 
effectiveness of programs that reward regulated entities for complying with environmental 
regulatory requirements and that publishing the number of complying companies can create an 
impression of widespread compliance); Cooter, supra note 159, at 19 (“To induce people to 
internalize values, the state must reward citizens for having civic virtue. For this purpose, officials 
bestow honors, awards, and praise, as well as their opposites (dishonor, punishments, and 
condemnations).”). 
 180. See Carlson, supra note 15, at 1232 (“Recyclers get either intrinsic satisfaction for doing 
the right thing, approval from friends and neighbors for their environmentally correct behavior, or 
both.”); Fishman, supra note 40, at 76 (“Buying and using [a CFL] helps save the world—and also 
saves the customer money—with no compromise on quality. Selflessness and self-satisfaction, 
twirled into a single $3 purchase.”); Walmart Fact Sheets, supra note 31. But see Richard A. Posner, 
Social Norms, Social Meaning, and Economic Analysis of Law: A Comment, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 
553, 560 (1998) (“I do not myself believe that many people do things because they think they are 
the right thing to do unless they have first used the plasticity of moral reasoning to align the ‘right’ 
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As discussed previously, both the esteem of others and self-esteem 
are important motivators of good behavior.181 But when the source of 
that esteem is withdrawn (no more smiley faces), or is only a one-shot 
event (the bumper sticker), then, as in the case of economic incentives, 
the individual may not repeat the environmentally responsible behavior 
(buying CFLs).182 Indeed, in the case of bumper stickers or public lists, 
the temptation to free ride on her one-time good behavior might be 
strong enough to allow an individual’s prior irresponsible behavior to 
return. Additionally, studies show that the effectiveness of non-monetary 
rewards at influencing individual behavior is limited to circumstances 
where the new behavior is of low to moderate cost, and where there is a 
community norm favoring the new behavior;183 neither of which may be 
true in the case of CFLs. 
The negative attributes of economic incentives, and the 
motivational uncertainty of both economic and non-economic incentives, 
put into question their effectiveness as motivational tools to persuade 
individuals to consume less electricity, let alone their ability to 
overcome the reluctance of people to buy CFLs despite their individual 
and social benefits. 
D. What Will It Take to Make the “Horse” Buy a CFL? 
Each of the motivational tools underlying the initiatives set forth in 
this Article—smart meters, comparative billing, and personal 
incentives—has drawbacks. This Article suggests that none is sufficient 
by itself to overcome the barriers to making individuals conform to the 
norm of energy conservation by purchasing a CFL—a conclusion that is 
consistent with my prior work in this area. However, it may not be 
enough simply to aggregate these persuasive techniques or tailor them to 
the target audience, as I previously suggested with respect to getting 
people to internalize a new norm of individual environmental 
                                                           
with their self-interest. I do not think that knowledge of what is morally right is motivational in any 
serious sense for anyone except a handful of saints . . . . [I]n general[,] you need to appeal to a 
person’s altruism, fear, or pride (sometimes moral pride, which is not to be confused with morality) 
to explain non-self-interested behavior.”). 
 181. See supra notes 125-36 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 175-79 and 
accompanying text. 
 182. Whether such an individual will feel guilty for her behavior, which, in turn, might 
motivate her not to free ride, is open to question. See ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 43 
(2000) (“[N]o well-developed theory of guilt allows us to make predictions about when [it will be 
influential] or what kinds of people feel guilt and what kinds of people do not. So . . . we cannot rely 
on a theory of guilt for an explanation.”). 
 183. Stern, supra note 34, at 563. 
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responsibility and improve their environmental behavior.184 
Instead, for individuals to entertain the thought of purchasing a 
CFL, the product will have to be redesigned—its mercury content and 
price reduced and its attractiveness and convenience improved. This 
conclusion is based both on Wal-Mart’s successful campaign to get its 
customers to buy CFLs and on the weakness of the motivational tools 
discussed in this Article. Once those structural—Professor Ann 
Carlson’s “architectural”185—changes to CFLs have been made, then 
information, comparative billing, and various economic and non-
economic personal incentives can play an important role in pushing 
individuals to swap out their incandescent bulbs for CFLs. 
Wal-Mart has launched a major campaign to get its customers to 
buy CFLs and has sold over 260 million of these light bulbs in two and a 
half years.186 The box store has tackled each of the structural inhibitors 
to purchasing CFLs. For example, Wal-Mart has reduced the cost of 
CFLs by offering its own brand at a lower price.187 It has also addressed 
the mercury problem by working with CFL manufacturers to reduce 
their mercury content.188 Wal-Mart has taken steps to make buying CFLs 
easier by reconfiguring the lighting displays in its stores to draw 
attention to CFLs, offering interactive displays so customers can 
compare CFL qualities and styles, and allowing its customers to 
purchase CFLs online.189 
Wal-Mart is on the right track. By tackling the consumer barriers 
inhibiting the purchase of CFLs head-on and making the product 
something individuals want to buy, the company is having a more direct 
effect on the purchase of CFLs than by relying solely on a variety of 
behavioral incentives to motivate individuals to engage in the desired 
environmental behavior. The global lesson learned from the CFL story 
for those who seek to improve individual environmental behavior is that 
when the barriers to action inhere in the action itself and are not 
                                                           
 184. Stern, supra note 114, at 10789 (stating that getting people to change their behavior is 
more complex than any single factor, especially if one is trying to influence a substantial portion of 
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 185. Carlson, supra note 15, at 1254. 
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cognitively induced, no amount of motivational inducement can 
overcome them until the structural obstacles preventing the individual 
from engaging in the good behavior are attended to. 
However, this is not to say that information, the desire of 
individuals to conform or compete, their need for self-esteem or the 
esteem of others, or their receptivity to a good deal have no role in 
getting them to swap out their light bulbs. Even after structural changes 
are made to CFLs, there still needs to be a reason for an individual to get 
up off the couch and go buy one. It is just too early to apply these 
motivational tools and expect that individuals will conform to the norm 
of energy conservation and behave in a more environmentally 
responsible manner by switching light bulbs. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
My previous articles suggest that relying on a single persuasive tool 
to change individual environmental behavior will not work, but that a 
combination of techniques, like public education, sanctions, and market-
based incentives, specifically tailored to the desired activity and the 
targeted audience may achieve the goal. That conclusion has not fared 
well in this Article, where several of these persuasive techniques have 
been applied to see if they could motivate individuals to swap out their 
light bulbs, even though doing that conforms to the norm of energy 
conservation and is the environmentally responsible thing to do. The 
conclusion that these motivational tools will not work alone or in the 
aggregate when the inhibitors to behavioral change inhere in the product 
or activity itself, while a surprise to me, seems intuitively correct. It is 
also a conclusion that Professor Ann Carlson’s work on recycling 
supports where she says architectural changes—that is changes in how 
people recycle—are more important than norms or incentives in getting 
people to recycle.190 
This does not mean that norms, like the energy conservation norm, 
play no role in influencing individual behavior. They do play a role. 
However, this Article shows that that role is more limited than I 
originally thought. Norms cannot direct how they will be implemented, 
especially when the barriers to norm implementation inhere in the 
desired behavior. Wal-Mart’s campaign demonstrates that until the 
physical impediments to buying CFLs are removed, neither norms nor 
persuasive techniques have the strength to overcome the general barriers 
to good environmental behavior, let alone the structural barriers to 
purchasing CFLs. Therefore, norms not only require the assistance of 
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external motivators to change behavior, as my prior work concluded, but 
to be effective they must also operate on a level playing field where the 
obstacles to good environmental behavior have been removed. 
 
